Taxation - Right to Counsel by Bigley, Gerard M.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 7 Number 2 Article 10 
1968 
Taxation - Right to Counsel 
Gerard M. Bigley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gerard M. Bigley, Taxation - Right to Counsel, 7 Duq. L. Rev. 303 (1968). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol7/iss2/10 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Recent Decisions
TAXATION-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-Miranda-type warnings are not re-
quired in relation to noncustodial questioning during initial stages of
a tax inquiry.
United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1968).
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began an investigation of one
Riordan, a former internal revenue agent, suspected of illegal activities
with certain taxpayers, including preparation of tax returns. Internal
revenue agents and special agents were assigned to investigate fifty to
seventy-five taxpayers who may have dealt with Riordan, including
Squeri, who owned and operated a restaurant which Riordan fre-
quented. The revenue agents were to audit the various taxpayers'
returns for the years 1959 to 1961. The special agents were then to see
if Riordan had prepared any of the returns and, if he did, whether
there were any false entries for which he would be responsible.
On October 8, 1963, the IRS contacted Squeri and requested him to
come for an interview and to bring records he used in preparing his
returns. On October 16, Squeri, with his accountant, appeared at the
IRS office and was met by a revenue agent and a special agent. The
special agent warned Squeri that he had a right not to answer any
questions which would tend to incriminate him, but also informed
Squeri that he was investigating Riordan's activities and wanted to
question him about his dealings with Riordan. He added that a revenue
agent would later conduct a civil audit of his records. As a result of the
special agent's questioning, Squeri was cleared of any improper con-
nection with Riordan. However, the revenue agent proceeded with the
audit and examined thirteen savings passbooks which Squeri brought
to the interview.' These passbooks contained indications of income
not included in his tax returns. The revenue agent concluded there
was a possibility of fraud, and a special agent was then assigned to
establish if criminal charges were warranted.
In October of 1964, a decision was made that there was sufficient
evidence to consider recommending prosecution; Squeri was so in-
formed, and was invited to confer on the subject. After Squeri's
initial contact with the IRS agents on October 16, 1963, where he was
informed that the criminal investigation related to Riordan and that
his returns would be subject to a civil audit, and prior to the proposed
conference, he was not informed of the changing nature of the in-
vestigation of his own returns. At this point he retained an attorney.
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Subsequently, Squeri was convicted for wilfully attempting to evade
over $100,000 in taxes, and received a two year sentence, (suspended
with probation for one year), and a fine of $10,000.
Squeri's pre-trial motion to suppress certain records delivered to the
IRS during the audit of his returns was denied. Squeri appealed,
alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when certain
records were obtained because agents misrepresented the nature and
purpose of the investigation, and also because he was not informed of
his right to counsel1 at the first meeting on October 16, 1963. Squeri re-
lied on Miranda v. Arizona,2 as the basis of his constitutional argument.
The instant court found no deceit or misrepresentation and in dispos-
ing of this facet of Squeri's argument, pointed out that the notice that
his returns were being audited gave "him full and accurate information
as to the extent of the IRS inquiry."3
As to Squeri's argument that he should have been given Miranda
warnings4 at the first meeting with the agents, the court established
that Miranda warnings are required "because of the compelling at-
mosphere inherent in the process of in custody questioning .... [and
that the rationale of Miranda is] relevant only where the questioning
is conducted in custody or in circumstances which are similarly in-
herently compelling." 5 The Miranda rationale, the court stated, does
not apply when the circumstances are such that "there are no in-
herently compulsive pressures to be overcome." 6 The court also relied
on Mathis v. United States7 to reinforce its conclusion that it is the
questioning in custody which activates the need for warnings. The
court looked at the circumstances surrounding Squeri's presence at the
October 16 interview in the IRS office, and concluded that "[t]hese
circumstances present none of the inherently compulsive aspects which
the Supreme Court found to exist in the process of custodial inter-
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785, 788 (2d Cir. 1968).
4. "He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." 384 U.S. at 479.
5. 398 F.2d at 788-89.
6. Id. at 789.
7. 88 S. Ct. 1503 (1968). In Mathis, the Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings
were required where the defendant had been questioned by IRS agents, as part of a




rogation, and therefore the reasoning of Miranda and Mathis does not
apply to the present case. '" 8
The crime of tax evasion is strikingly dissimilar to other forms of
crime. When a crime occurs in the ordinary situation an investigation
is begun to discover the offender. Whereas, in a tax fraud case, the
suspect is known and the investigation is centered on whether a crime
has been committed.9 Basic to an understanding of how the tax case
differs is an understanding of how a fraud investigation is initiated. A
fraud investigation can result from a referral by the Audit Division of
the IRS whose primary concern is to determine if there is a civil ad-
justment necessary, to the Intelligence Division, whose primary interest
is whether there has been a criminal violation of the revenue laws. If
a fraud investigation is initiated, civil aspects of the case are suspended,
and a special agent of the Intelligence Division is assigned to de-
termine whether the taxpayer has defrauded the government. The
special agent is a criminal investigator and differs in no essential way
from any other law enforcement officer. A fraud investigation can also
be initiated where information of fraudulent activity is directly com-
municated to the Intelligence Division. In this situation an investiga-
tion is begun directly by the Intelligence Division, without the
preliminaries of a civil audit. 10
The taxpayer seemingly has never been in an enviable position in
relation to the applicability of constitutional guarantees to fraud in-
vestigation. Prior to Miranda and Escobedo v. Illinois," the question
of whether or not constitutional guarantees applied to a fraud investi-
gation was largely determined on fourth 2 and fifth 3 amendment
grounds. In Turner v. United States,14 the fourth circuit in ruling on
the application of Gouled v. United States,'5 to Turner, finding no
8. 398 F.2d at 789.
9. See Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 384 U.S.
1011 (1966).
10. Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a .Fraud Investigation, 44
TAXES 660, 661-62 (1966).
11. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
12. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported'by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNsr.
amend. IV.
13. The fifth amendment provides in part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of . . . liberty, or property,
without due process of law; .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. 222 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955).
15. In Gouled the Supreme Court held that defendants' fourth and fifth amendment
rights had been violated when an agent of the United States obtained entrance to de-
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coercion on the part of the special agent, nor any affirmative misrepre-
sentation by him, held that the defendant's fourth and fifth amend-
ment rights had not been violated. The question of misrepresentation
or coercion had a basic relationship to the matter of whether or not
the information had been voluntarily and understandingly given,
which, in turn, bore directly on the issue of whether or not the tax-
payer's fourth and fifth amendment rights had been violated. If the
special agent had coerced or deceived a taxpayer into submitting the
information desired this would be unreasonable and a prohibited
search and seizure. 16 In such case that taxpayer would be an "unwill-
ing source of the evidence" and in effect would be compelled to testify
against himself. 17 At this point in the development of constitutional
criminal procedure, it was held that a defendant need not be warned
that anything he submitted might be used against him, provided that
it was voluntarily and understandingly given.'
During this same period in the development of the law relating to
constitutional privileges in fraud investigations there were, however,
other cases which enunciated an awareness that IRS agents may engage
in conduct which would vitiate the taxpayer's apparent consent in
handing over his records, although the conduct might not technically
be considered an affirmative misrepresentation. A special agent could
not conceal his presence in the case and direct the revenue agent to
obtain incriminating evidence.' 9 A special agent assigned to investigate
criminal wrongdoing other than tax fraud, could not use evidence of
the fraud obtained through deceiving the taxpayer into believing the
investigation was merely a routine civil investigation. 20
This division in the cases existed until United States v. Sclafani.2' In
Sclafani the taxpayer had been dealing with a revenue agent, who after
discovering some evidence of fraud, referred the case to the Intelligence
fendants' office under the guise of friendship and later obtained by "stealth," certain
incriminating documents used to convict defendants for conspiracy to defraud the United
States Government. 255 U.S. 298 (1921), rev'd on other grounds, Warden v. Maryland,
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
16. 255 U.S. at 305.
17. Id. at 306.
18. Hanson v. United States, 186 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950); Montgomery v. United
States, 203 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v. Burdick, 214 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954);
and cases cited in Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926, 931 (4th Cir. 1955).
19. United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1955); Matter of Bodkin,
165 F. Supp. 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
20. United States v. Wheeler, 149 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Pa. 1957). See also, United
States v. Wolrich, 119 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Guerrina, 112 F.
Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1953), modified, 126 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
21. 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959).
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Division, and a special agent was assigned. Neither agent informed
Sclafani of the latter's special duties. Subsequently, Sclafani was con-
victed of tax evasion and on appeal claimed that his consent to the
searches (examination of records) incident to the investigation was
limited to an investigation for civil purposes and when, without dis-
closing the altered purpose of the investigation, the revenue agent
brought in a criminal investigator, the original consent was exceeded,
and the resulting searches and seizures were in violation of his fourth
amendment rights. The court in Sclafani stated that a failure to disclose
the changing nature of the investigation was not deceitful, and the
information that a taxpayer's returns are being audited gives sufficient
notice that a criminal prosecution might result, regardless of whether
the agents contemplate civil or criminal action when they interview
him.22 Squeri, therefore seems to extend Sclafani as related to fourth
and fifth amendment aspects of constitutional warnings in fraud in-
vestigation.
In addition to the fourth and fifth amendment arguments, as out-
lined previously, the taxpayer has not fared well in claiming a sixth
amendment privilege during a fraud investigation, despite Escobedo23
and Miranda.24 The view that the Escobedo and Miranda requirements
do not apply to noncustodial questioning by IRS agents has been
adopted by every United States Circuit Court which has passed on the
question,25 and by a majority of the district courts which have done
so. 26 There are however, a minority of district courts which hold
Escobedo and Miranda requirements applicable to fraud investiga-
tions.2 7 In rejecting an Escobedo argument that the taxpayer should be
22. Id. at 414-15.
23. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
24. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
25. Morgan v. United States, 377 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1967); Schlinsky v. United States,
379 F.2d 735 (lst Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920 (1967); United States v. Maius,
378 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1967), cert' denied, 389 U.S. 905 (1967); Selinger v. Bigler, 377 F.2d
542 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 904 (1967); Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d
898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966); and Frohmann v. United States,
380 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1967).
26. United States v. Rabin, 271 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Stern v. Robinson, 262
F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Tenn. 1966); United States v. Spinney, 264 F. Supp. '774 (D. Mass.
1966); United States v. Carlson, 260 F. Supp. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Hill,
260 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Cal. 1966); United States v. Fiore, 258 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa.
1966); Smith v. United States, 250 F. Supp 803 (D.N.J. 1966); Bohrod v. United States,
248 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Wis. 1965).
27. United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. I1. 1967); United States v.
Kingry, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 762 (N.D. Fla. 1967); United States v. Schoenburg, 19 Am.




warned of his right to counsel after the investigation has shifted from
the investigatory to the accusatory stage, that is, after it begins to
"focus on a particular suspect" 28 (by virtue of the presence of a special
agent in the case), the courts passing on the question have adopted the
rationale expressed in Kohatsu v. United States.29 In rejecting the
Miranda requirements those courts deciding the issue appear to have
based their rationale on the lack of custodial interrogation. 0
The holding in United States v. Turzynski31 reveals the attitude of
courts which hold Miranda and Escobedo requirements applicable to
fraud investigation:
We hold that once a taxpayer becomes the subject of a criminal
tax investigation, as evidenced by the referral of the investigation
to the Intelligence Division or otherwise, our adversary process of
criminal justice has become directed against him as a potential
criminal defendant. Any evidence obtained from him is admissable
only if the taxpayer furnished it after knowlingly and voluntarily
waiving his constitutional rights and priveleges.3 2
The affirmative misrepresentation rationale enunciated in Sclafani,33
has been criticized by tax practitioners as denying the taxpayer protec-
tion of his constitutional rights. 34 As relates to fraud investigation,
courts adopting the Sclafani test evidently presume that because the
agent has made no affirmative misrepresentation, and it is known by the
taxpayer that a government agent is in the case, his subsequent coopera-
tion is voluntary. However, it seems anomalous to hold cooperation
voluntary and thus a waiver of fourth and fifth amendment privileges,
when the taxpayer never really knowingly waives these rights because
of his not being informed of those rights.
Tax practitioners have advanced arguments in support of the con-
28. 378 U.S. at 490.
29. 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. I011 (1966). In Kohatsu the
court stated at 901: "The Supreme Court in Escobedo referred to an unsolved crime.
The existence of the crime was apparent. The police were seeking to identify the
offender. The accused had been taken into custody. In the instant case the essential
question to be determined by the investigations of the revenue agents was whether in
fact any crime had been committed." Other post-Escobedo, pre-Miranda cases holding
Escobedo inapplicable to the instant situation are United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d
941 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965); and Rickey v. United States, 360
F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1966), which was a per curiam application of Kohatsu.
30. See cases cited in note 25, supra.
31. 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Il1. 1967). See cases cited in note 27, supra.
32. 268 F. Supp. at 850.
33. 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1959). See text at note 22, supra.
34. Burns, Searches and Seizures; The Suppression of Evidence, New York University
20th Institution on Federal Taxationi 1081 (1962).
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tention that Miranda warnings should be required at the outset of a
criminal tax investigation 3 5 however, the greatest difficulty in applying
Miranda to a fraud investigation lies in the fact that in the average
criminal tax investigation the taxpayer is not in custody. The instant
court, in rejecting appellant's argument for Miranda warnings, demon-
strated reliance on the custody factor,38 and has thus joined the
majority of courts which have passed on the subject.3 7 The court pro-
ceeded on the premise that custody has some independent constitutional
significance. They took no special notice of the function of the special
agent, a criminal investigator, assigned to the Intelligence Division
whose jurisdiction is limited to criminal investigations. The average
taxpayer is not aware of the special agent's criminal function because of
the mere identity of him as a special agent. 38 The taxpayer cannot
really discern the important difference between a revenue agent and a
special agent,39 or the significance of a routine audit as distinguished
from a joint investigation.40 Frequently, after dealing with a revenue
agent over routine audit matters, the taxpayer finds the investigation
augmented by a special agent whose presence and purpose as a criminal
investigator is never disclosed to the taxpayer. Ignorant of the possible
criminal consequences, the taxpayer continues to cooperate with the
agents. 41 The special agent often uses very subtle and disarming tech-
niques in interviewing the taxpayer.42 At the transition of a civil to a
criminal investigation, the special agent has a suspect for possible crim-
inal prosecution; and the taxpayer is a suspect, no less than an indi-
vidual under interrogation for other crimes. Although the taxpayer is
35. See, e.g., Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 53 A.B.A.J.
517 (1967); Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation,
44 TAXES 660 (1966).
36. 398 F.2d at 789.
37. See cases cited in notes 25 and 26, supra.
38. Lipton, The Taxpayer's Rights: Investigation of Tax Fraud Cases, 42 A.B.A.J. 325
(1965); Ludlam, Tax Fraud Investigations: A Plea for Constitutional Procedures, 43
A.B.A.J. 1009, 1010 (1957).
39. Burns, supra note 34, at 1087.
40. Note, Constitutional Aspects of Federal" Tax Investigations, 57 COLUM. L. REV.
676, 687 (1957); Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Federal Tax Investi-
gations, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 74, 81 (1961).
41. United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847, 851 (N.D. Ill. 1967). The court
stated that "[i]n some respects the tax investigation is more insidious and dishonest than
the custodial interrogation, for the suspect in custody well knows his interrogators are
seeking evidence to convict him of a crime while the tax suspect is permitted and even
encouraged to believe that no criminal prosecution is in contemplation."
42. See Avakian, Rights and Remedies of Taxpayers Suspected of Fraud, 33 TAXEs
878, 879-80 (1955), for an interesting description of the agents approach.
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not technically in custody, he is faced with a representative of the gov-
ernment who possesses an awesome array of coercive powers.43
An adversary process is begun when a special agent has entered an
investigation, and it is submitted that it is logically irrelevant to
distinguish the situation in terms of having a crime and seeking an
offender, as opposed to having a suspect and trying to ascertain if a
crime has been committed. In either instance, the investigation is con-
ducted with an ultimate view to criminal prosecution and conviction.
It is at this point, in keeping with the fundamental concepts of con-
stitutional safeguards, that the taxpayer should be fully apprised of his
fifth and sixth amendment rights. Custody provides a concrete point at
which it can be said that the adversary process has begun, however,
this not the only situation in which the investigative machinery of
government is directed at a particular individual.*
Gerard M. Bigley
CONTRACTS-REERVATION OF POWER TO TERMINATE EXISTING CONTRACT
-The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that a clause requiring
written notice of termination within sixty days is satisfied by notice re-
ceived two days beyond termination date.
Music, Inc. v. Henry B. Klein Co., 213 Pa. Super. 182, 245 A.2d 650
(1968).
Plaintiff contracted to provide defendant Klein programmed music ser-
vice. The contract as quoted by the court provided:
The term of this agreement shall be for three (3) years and eight
(8) months from the date of installation and shall continue there-
43. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7602. (Statutory right to inspect books and
records, etc.).
* During the writing of this casenote the IRS changed policy regarding constitutional
warnings at the initial stages of a tax investigation. Now at an initial meeting with a
taxpayer, an IRS special agent is required to identify himself, describe his function, and
advise the taxpayer that anything he says may be used against him. The agent must also
tell the taxpayer that he cannot be compelled to incriminate himself by answering any
questions or producing any documents, and that he has the right to seek the assistance
of an attorney before responding.
Previously, the special agent identified himself and described his function at the first
meeting with a taxpayer, but was not required to give further advice unless the taxpayer
was in custody or the investigation proceeded beyond the preliminary stage. See Standard
Federal Tax Reports, 55 TAxEs ON PARADE 54 (Nov. 1968).
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